

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY

REPORT NO.

00-1-3, 203, 015

SUBJECT: GENE F. SIEBERT, Enviro. Services Group
Comments: Return to the PWV's
Position Responsibility to Congress
Position with Authority Award of
Siebert

DATE DISTR.

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REFERENCES

Digitized by srujanika@gmail.com

(NY-52511)

DATE OF
INFO 20 Nov 61 and cont'd.
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DATE ACQ. 1/21/00 2000

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Polytechnic Inst.

~~4 hours UP protection~~

SOURCE

US citizens, head of the clandestine department of a large US subsidized
institution.

During his period at NY City to 23 Oct 51, Major B Flanagan, Street Anderson
Sgt Major under Port-Ferry was my Adjutant, who under the command of
Major F. and members of his staff.

1. G. M. Kholodenko-Pavlov came to do post-doctoral research work in the Department of Chemistry under the supervision of Prof. Dr. V. V. Gerasimov, on 27 Oct. 61. He came pursuant to the Soviet-American exchange agreement and it was intended that he would work for a period of three or four months. He has been here less than a week when his contract and immigration documents commenced on 29 Oct. 61. Prior to coming here, he had been a Scientific Associate of the Institute of Physical Hydromechanics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.
 2. We were very much disturbed by Pavlov's actions because we found that the whole academic program might have been jeopardized. So, on 27 Oct. 61, we sent a cable to Professor Ruzicka, Head of the Dept. of Chemistry at the University of Illinois, who is the Head of the Institute of Chemical Physics, Moscow, where Pavlov had worked. Ruzicka replied to this cable with a cable which we received 11 Nov. 61. It was very conciliatory. It stated that Pavlov could work for thirty months "as are mutually agreed," to which "each will write a letter with definite terms." However, no such letter has arrived to date, as Nov. 11.
 3. Another cable was sent by the National Academy of Sciences, 6 Nov. 61 to the Minister of Education, Prof. N. P. Kravchenko, President of the Society of Friends of the USSR, on 29 Oct. 61, but we reply has been received, or fax as I know.
 4. As far as I am concerned, I am sure that Professor G. M. Pavlov is a good and highly rated man owing to the scope of his most recent publications.
 5. I think this agreement is valid, but it is a fact to be very concerned. Or it may have been a representative of one of the American missions that brought about this result.
 6. Pavlov turned in very well now. He is a very genial young fellow. We gave him the title of Research Assistant. He should be used with great care.

* Prof. Herman Mark & Murray Goodman

12/44 Coffey to
F11SIC and SR/6.

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to a bombing mission, for example. They themselves talked too much and was too friendly. He did not keep his mouth shut and he did not eat like a horse. I do know they condemned him to the responsibility to communicate. I condemn myself.

13. So I suspect that Prisgov did his own hole. He had to report to the Council of the UN Organization every week and, in the process, his general attitude got known to them. He talked too much. His communication with others was not complete.
14. Again, what he was writing we have been very close to what he had been writing on other documents and the Council may have jumped to the conclusion that he was telling us all that he knew.
15. The problem in which he would have was the compartmentalization of finance and administration using a communists metal communists system. For example, one of the compartments on which he worked handled him finance, budget, finance, and the other another, probably.
16. We also know, to many of the staff and the members with the UN Staff who have had some probably most contacts with the man with whom he shared a laboratory. This was an Italian, named Dr. Enrico Prisgov. They happened to be good friends.
17. I do not think that Prisgov was the victim of an informer. I have considered about this a lot but I do not think this is what happened. I think, as I said before, that he dug his own hole. Institutional, we were most anxious to keep this incident out of the papers and there was no hook. Had there been an informer, this might not have been the case.

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